March 9, 2004
"Full Faith and Credit"--A Commentary by Prof. Lea Brilmayer
(This essay was originally published in the Tuesday, March 9, 2004, edition of the Wall Street Journal.)
Full Faith and Credit
By Lea Brilmayer, Howard M. Holtzmann Professor of International Law
Last Wednesday's hearing before the Senate's "Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights" was billed as the occasion for a serious discussion on the need for a constitutional amendment to limit the interstate effects of Goodridge, the Massachusetts court decision recognizing a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Why else would the hearing's organizers invite me, a professor with no particular published opinion on gay rights but dozens of technical publications on interstate jurisdiction?
Prepared to do battle over the correct interpretation of the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause, I found myself instead in the middle of a debate about whether marriage is a good thing, and who really loves America's kids the most -- Republicans or Democrats.
Like many political debates, the discussion was framed in
absolutist terms. Conservatives say that without a constitutional amendment, Goodridge goes national. Gays will travel to Massachusetts to get married and then their home states will be forced (under the Full Faith and Credit Clause) to recognize their marriages. Traditional marriage (apparently a frailer institution than I'd realized) will be fatally undermined unless we act now to prevent the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from imposing its will upon the whole nation. Either amend the Constitution to adopt a national, and traditional, definition of marriage (they say) or there will soon be gay and lesbian married couples living in your own neighborhood. Either it's their nationwide standard -- anyone can marry -- or it's ours.
The fly in the ointment was that nobody bothered to check
whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause had actually ever been read to require one state to recognize another state's marriages. It hasn't. Longstanding precedent from around the country holds that a state need not recognize a marriage entered into in another state with different marriage laws if those laws are contrary to strongly held local public policy. The "public policy doctrine," almost as old as this country's legal system, has been applied to foreign marriages between first cousins, persons too recently divorced, persons of different races, and persons under the age of consent. The granting of a marriage license has always been treated differently than a court award, which is indeed entitled to full interstate recognition. Court judgments are entitled to full faith and credit but historically very little interstate recognition has been given to licenses.
From a technical legal point of view, the debate at last week's hearing was entirely unnecessary. But inciting a divisive and diversionary debate over whether America's children will only thrive in traditional marriages (on the one hand) or whether people who oppose gay marriage are bigots (on the other) was probably a central objective in certain quarters. Social conservatives, in particular, have a vested interest in overstating the "domino effect" of Goodridge. This is particularly true in an election year. Only an ivory tower academic carrying a text full of footnotes would notice anything odd.
The assumption that there must be a single national definition of marriage --traditional or open-ended -- is mistaken and pernicious. It is mistaken because the existing constitutional framework has long accommodated differing marriage laws. This is an area where the slogan "states rights" not only works relatively well, but also has traditionally been left to do its job. We are familiar with the problems of integrating different marriage laws because for the last 200 years the issue has been left, fairly successfully, to the states. The assumption is pernicious because the winner-takes-all
attitude that it engenders now has social conservatives pushing us down the constitutional-amendment path. For those who see the matter in terms of gay rights, this would be a tragedy. But it would also be a tragedy for those who genuinely favor local autonomy, or even those of us who genuinely favor keeping the constitutional text uncluttered by unnecessary amendments.
If today's proponents of a marriage amendment are motivated by the fear of some full faith and credit chain-reaction set off in other states by Massachusetts, they needn't be. If they are motivated by the desire to assert political control over what happens inside Massachusetts, they shouldn't be. In our 200-year constitutional history, there has never yet been a federal constitutional amendment designed specifically to reverse a state's interpretation of its own laws. Goodridge, whether decided rightly or wrongly, was decided according to Massachusetts' highest court's view of Massachusetts law. People in other states have no legitimate interest in forcing Massachusetts to reverse itself -- Massachusetts will do that itself, if and when it wants to -- and those who want to try should certainly not cite the Full Faith and Credit clause in rationalizing their attempts.
Unlike most other hotly contested social issues, the current constitutional marriage debate actually has a perfectly good technical solution. We should just keep doing what we've been doing for the last 200 years.